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THEY CAN DO WHAT!? LIMITATIONS ON THE 
USE OF CHANGE-OF-TERMS CLAUSES 
Peter A. Alces • and Michael M. Greenfieldt 
INTRODUCTION 
Contract is based on intent, specifically the intent to consent to 
some adjustment of rights and risk in exchange for a quid pro quo. 
We determine the enforceability of that allocation of rights and risk at 
the outset of the parties' undertaking. That is, whether a transaction is 
a contract, an enforceable promise, is determined by reference to the 
parties' exchange ab initio. We could not brook a contract law that 
accommodated the parties' weaving in and out of a contract as the 
vicissitudes of their transactional interests and positions changed over 
time. It is significant that contract fzxes risk after it first allocates it. 
Contract too is a supple device, and therein lies the source of some 
of its greatest value in the course of exchanges. The certain initial 
allocation of risk is leavened by the law's ability to accommodate the 
parties' interests in flexibility. Although there are gains to be realized 
from certainty, there are also benefits to reserving the ability to adjust 
the initial allocation of rights and responsibilities in order for both 
parties to capture as many benefits of exchange as they can. And that 
vindication of flexibility need not result in a zero-sum game. Even 
the weaker contracting party may benefit from contract doctrine that 
permits the stronger contracting party to effect adjustments in the 
initial allocation as changing circumstances warrant. So long as the 
dominant party is able to extricate itself from an allocation of risk 
that becomes less attractive, that dominant party is more likely to 
enter into the contract in the first place, or so the story goes. 
• Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law. The 
authors are indebted to Brandon Murrill, J.D. 2011, and Matthew A. Welch, J.D. 2010, The College of 
William & Mary School of Law for their invaluable research assistance. Deficiencies of the finished 
product remain the fault of the authors alone. 
t George Alexander Madill Professor of Contracts and Commercial Law, Washington University 
in St. Louis School of Law. 
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But there is another side to the story. Contracts are relational1 and 
give rise to expectations between the parties. During the course of the 
contractual relationship, the parties may make investments based on 
those expectations and the initial allocation of rights and risk. If the 
dominant party then adjusts that allocation, no matter how good the 
reason, the weaker party may be profoundly prejudiced by the 
adjustment. That prejudice is not mitigated significantly by the fact 
that the contract explicitly reserved the dominant party's right to 
adjust the initial allocation as circumstances, or simply the dominant 
party's interests, dictate. So the provision of a unilateral right to 
amend the terms of a contract rests uneasily with fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of contract liability as well as, perhaps, 
with contract doctrine. There is a tension for the law to resolve, and 
the tools-viz., contract doctrine-available to resolve that tension 
may not be up to the task; they may lack the ability to refine the 
balance in ways that can resolve the tension between certainty and 
flexibility that contract law vindicates. 
Although the phenomenon of unilateral adjustment of contract 
terms is not a new one,2 the uneasy fit between the dominant party's 
I. Ian Macneil defines the relational contract theory: 
A relational contract theory may be defined as any theory based on the following four 
core propositions: 
First, every transaction is embedded in complex relations. 
Second, understanding any transaction requires understanding all essential elements 
of its enveloping relations. 
Third, effective analysis of any transaction requires recognition and consideration of 
all essential elements of its enveloping relations that might affect the transaction 
significantly. 
Fourth, combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions is more efficient 
and produces a more complete and sure fmal analytical product than does commencing 
with non-contextual analysis of transactions. For purposes of this Article, relational 
contract theory means these four propositions, nothing more and nothing less. 
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 877, 881-82 
(2000). Ian Macneil is the leading relational contract theory scholar. For elaboration on the relational 
contract theory, see also Ian R. Macneil, Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract Theory, 9 Soc. & 
LEGAL STUD. 431 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Ian R. 
Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich 
Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981). 
2. See, e.g., Bakery & Confectionery Workers' lnt'l Union v. Nat'! Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684, 688 
(3d Cir. 1949) (upholding actions taken pursuant to a change-of-terms provision regarding pensions in 
employment contract); Sadie v. Bank America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (expert 
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ability to change terms and the weaker party's interest in the certainty 
and enforceability of the original terms has come into particularly 
stark relief as the fabric of consumer transactions is strained during 
challenging economic times. It is one thing to become upset with 
your credit card issuer and pay off the card by accessing your equity 
line; it is quite another when you become upset with your credit card 
issuer at a time in which the available credit on your equity line is 
reduced to the point that you cannot pay off and walk away from the 
credit card issuer. So once you lose the ability to walk away from 
new, less attractive terms, the right to do so is illusory. 
This article will survey the numerous contexts in which one party 
reserves the right to unilaterally adjust the terms of a continuing 
contract, perhaps subject to the other party's right to terminate the 
contractual relationship.3 Our focus is on contracts that endeavor to 
fix the terms of the parties' deal across a series of interactions, rather 
than discrete but recurring transactions in which one party reserves 
the right to change terms in succeeding contracts. We have found 
examples of unilateral change-of-terms provisions in a range of 
consumer contracting settings including, perhaps most notably, credit 
cards, the subject of recent federal legislation designed to curb 
overreaching by card issuers.4 Not surprisingly, banks also typically 
testified that "including a change-of-terms provision in account agreements ha[s] been the industry 
practice [in the credit card industry] since bank credit cards first became available in the 1960's"); 
Automatic Vending Co. v. Wisdom, 6 Cal. Rptr. 31,33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (finding contract and 
unilateral rate changes enforceable because of good faith obligation bestowed upon modifYing party); 
State v. San Francisco Sav. & Loan Soc'y, 225 P. 309, 311-12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (holding that 
depositors that signed an agreement with a bank which allowed the bank to change its bylaws at a later 
time were not bound to amendments eliminating the payment of interest on dormant accounts); Krupp v. 
Franklin Sav. Bank, 255 A.D. 15, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (finding amendments to be binding on the 
consumer automatically because of "the express agreement between the parties to abide by amended by-
laws"). 
3. The UCC distinguishes between "termination" and "cancellation." "'Termination' occurs when 
either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or Jaw puts an end to the contract otherwise than 
for its breach. On 'termination' all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but 
any right based on prior breach or performance survives." U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (2002). "Cancellation," on 
the other hand, "occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other and its 
effect is the same as that of 'termination' except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy for 
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance." U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2002). 
4. On May 24, 2009, President Obama signed legislation designed to regulate credit card 
companies' ability to alter terms of contracts. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act restricts credit card companies' ability to unilaterally increase interest rates. Credit Card 
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include unilateral change-of-terms provtstons m their account 
agreements, though this is not limited to the consumer setting. 5 
Similarly, providers of utility and utility-like services include 
unilateral change-of-terms provisions in their consumer agreements. 
We have found them in contracts for telephone service (both land-
line6 and cellular\ and television service (both cable8 and satellite9). 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734-66 
(2009). 
5. E.g., Bank of America Online Banking Service Agreement, http://www.bankofamerica.com/ 
onlinebanking/index.cfm?template=service_agreement&statecheck=VA#4h (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) 
("We may change this agreement at any time. For example, we may add, delete or amend terms or 
services. We will notifY you of such changes by mail or electronic message. If you initiate any transfer 
of funds or bill payment through your Online Banking services or make any Transfers Outside Bank of 
America after the effective date of a change, you indicate your agreement to the change."); Schwab 
Bank Savings Account Application Agreement, http://www.schwab.com/cms/P-2887295.3/ 
APP44939_02_WB.pdf?cmsid=P-2887295&cv0 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may add, delete, or 
amend terms or services at any time, including fees and charges for the Service. We will notifY you of 
such changes by mail, email, by posting a notice of a change online, or by any other means permitted by 
law. Use of the Service after the effective date of the change will constitute your acceptance of such 
amendment."). 
6. E.g., Vonage Terms of Service, http://www.vonage.com/tos/#CHANGES (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010) ("We may change the terms and conditions of this agreement from time to time. By subscribing to 
our service, you agree that we may provide to you by use of electronic communications required notices, 
agreements, and other information concerning Vonage, including changes to this agreement."). 
7. E.g., AT&T Wireless Service Agreement, http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-
resources/wireless-terms.jsp (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("You can accept the Service Agreement in 
several different ways: (i) by giving us your electronic signature via our website; (ii) by giving us your 
electronic signature over the phone through our automated phone consent process; (iii) by signing an 
electronic signature pad; (iv) in certain third party retail locations, by giving us your written signature; 
or (v) by using the wireless service after a modification to your service if you have been informed that 
continued use of the new service will mean you've given us your acceptance.") (emphasis added); 
Sprint.com Visitor Agreement and Acceptable Use Policy, http://www.sprint.com/legaVagreement.htrnl 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We reserve the right to modifY this Policy and Agreement at any time, 
effective upon its posting, as modified, on www.sprint.com. You agree to the Policy and Agreement by 
accessing or using our Website, products or services, or by sending any electronic transmission through 
our Network."); Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement: http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/ 
globalText?textName=CUSTOMER_AGREEMENT&jspName=footer/customerAgreement.jsp (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may change prices or any other term of your Service or this agreement at any 
time, but we'll send you written notice first. If you use your Service after the change takes effect, that 
means you're accepting the change. But if a change to your Plan or this agreement has a material 
adverse effect on you, you can cancel the line of Service that has been affected within 60 days of 
receiving the notice with no early termination fee."). 
8. E.g., Comcast Subscriber Agreement, http://www.comcast.net/terms/subscriber/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may change our prices, fees, the Services and/or the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement in the future. Unless this Agreement or applicable law specifies otherwise, we will give you 
thirty (30) days prior Notice of any significant change to this Agreement. If you find the change 
unacceptable, you have the right to cancel your Service(s). However, if you continue to receive 
Service(s) after the end of the notice period (the 'Effective Date') of the change, we will consider that 
you have accepted the changes. You may not modifY this Agreement by making any typed, handwritten, 
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Insofar as other utilities are regulated by governmental entities, and 
the terms of their contracts with consumers not the subject of 
individual negotiation, 10 there does not seem to be the same recourse 
to the unilateral change-of-terms provision, which might be telling in 
itself. 11 Other consumer contexts in which the dominant party retains 
the right to unilaterally change the terms of the contract include 
investment services, 12 on-line retailers, 13 customer loyalty reward 
or any other changes to it for any purpose."); Cox Communications Policies, 
https://www.cox.com/policy/#Online_Privacy_Policy (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Cox reserves the right 
to modify the terms of this Agreement or prices for the Service and may discontinue or revise any or all 
other aspects of the Service in its sole discretion at any time by posting changes online. Your continued 
use of the Service after changes are posted constitutes your acceptance of this Agreement as modified by 
the posted changes. The updated, online version of this Agreement shall supersede any prior version of 
this Agreement that may have been included in any software or related materials provided by Cox."); 
Time Warner Cable Residential Services Subscriber Agreement, http://help.twcable.com/htmV 
twc_sub_agreement2.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("TWC has the right to add to, modify, or delete 
any term of this Agreement, the Terms of Use, the Subscriber Privacy Notice or any applicable Tariff(s) 
at any time. An online version of this Agreement, the Terms of Use, the Subscriber Privacy Notice and 
any applicable Tariff(s), as so changed from time to time, will be accessible at 
http://help.twcable.comlhtmVpolicies.html or another online location designated by TWC, or can be 
obtained by calling my local TWC office."). 
9. E.g., Direct TV Customer Agreement, http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/globaV 
contentPage.jsp?assetld=P400042 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We reserve the right to change the terms 
and conditions on which we offer Service. If we make any such changes, we will send you a copy of 
your new Customer Agreement containing its effective date. You always have the right to cancel your 
Service, in whole or in part, at any time, and you may do so if you do not accept any such changed terms 
or conditions ... If you elect not to cancel your Service after receiving a new Customer Agreement, 
your continued receipt of Service constitutes acceptance of the changed terms and conditions."); Dish 
Network Residential Customer Agreement, http://www.dishnetwork.com/downloads/legaVRCA.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("If you are an existing Dish Network customer, we will notify you of any 
changes to, or 
Replacement of, this agreement, and your continued receipt of Dish Network services or equipment 
following receipt of such notice shall constitute your acceptance of such changed or replaced agreement. 
If you are an existing customer and do not wish to accept any changed or replaced agreement, you must 
notify us immediately and we will, at our option, either cancel your service or allow you to continue to 
receive your services under the previous version of this agreement") (text in all caps in original). 
I 0. For example, the Federal Power Act regulates the transmission and sale of electric energy to the 
public. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2005). In addition the Natural Gas Act regulates natural gas companies. 15 
u.s.c.s. § 717 (2005). 
II. E.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956) (holding that the 
Federal Power Act does not authorize unilateral contract changes); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile 
Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 337 (1956) ("[l]he Natural Gas Act does not give natural gas companies 
the right to change their rate contracts by their own unilateral action."). 
12. E.g., PTrade Account Agreement, https://us.etrade.com/e/t/prospectestationl 
help?id=l209021000 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Change in Terms/Termination of Service. We may 
change (add to, delete or amend) the terms or terminate your use of our electronic fund transfer services 
at any time, with or without cause and without affecting your outstanding obligations under this 
Agreement. We may terminate or suspend your electronic fund transfer service immediately if: any of 
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programs, 14 and various other providers of computer community 
services. 15 Such change-of-terms provisions are also found m 
you breach this or any other agreement with us; we have reason to believe that there has been or may be 
an unauthorized use of your account, Card or PIN; there are conflicting claims to the funds in your 
account; or any of you requests that we do so. If you ask us to terminate your account or the use of any 
Card, you will remain liable for subsequent transactions performed by you or any authorized user."); 
Schwab One Brokerage Account, https://investing.schwab.com/public/file?cmsid=P-221707 (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2010) ("In addition, you may in the future receive from Schwab supplemental terms or 
disclosures that pertain to certain account types, service features and benefit packages. These 
supplemental terms and disclosures, this Application Agreement and the Schwab One Account 
Agreement are collectively referred to as the ' Agreement and Disclosures.' You agree to read the 
Agreement and Disclosures carefully and retain copies for your records."). 
13. E.g., Amazon.com Conditions of Use, httpJ/www.amazon.com/gplhelp/customer/display.htmll 
ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeld=508088 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We reserve the right to make 
changes to our site, policies, and these Conditions of Use at any time. If any of these conditions shall be 
deemed invalid, void, or for any reason unenforceable, that condition shall be deemed severable and 
shall not affect the validity and enforceability of any remaining condition."); BamesandNoble.com 
Terms and Conditions of Use, http://www.bamesandnoble.com/include/terms_of_use.asp (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2010) ("Barnes & Noble.com reserves the right to make changes to the Barnes & Noble.com 
Site, posted policies and Terms of Use at any time without notice or liability."); Blockbuster Online 
Terms and Conditions, http://www.blockbuster.com/corporate/termsAndConditions (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010) ("Blockbuster may at any time, and at its sole discretion, modifY these Terms and Conditions of 
Use, including without limitation the Privacy Policy, with or without notice. Such modifications will be 
effective immediately upon posting. You agree to review these Terms and Condition of Use periodically 
and your continued use of this Site following such modifications will indicate your acceptance of these 
modified Terms and Conditions of Use. If you do not agree to any modification of these Terms and 
Conditions of Use, you must immediately stop using this Site."); Netflix Terms of Use, 
http://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Netflix, Inc., reserves the right, from 
time to time, with or without notice to you, to change these Terms of Use in our sole and absolute 
discretion. The most current version of these Terms of Use can be reviewed by clicking on the "Terms 
of Use" located at the bottom of the pages of the Netflix website. The most current version of the Terms 
of Use will supersede all previous versions. You can see changes from previous versions of the Terms of 
Use by clicking here."). 
14. E.g., Jet Blue Airlines Contract of Carriage, http://www.jetblue.com/p/jetblue_coc.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Carrier reserves the right, to the extent not prohibited by federal law, to change, 
delete, or add to any of the terms of this Contract without prior notice. All changes must be in writing 
and must be available for public inspection at each of the Carrier's ticket offices. To the extent there is a 
conflict between the Contract of Carriage and the Itinerary, AskBlue, or other publications, the Contract 
of Carriage governs."); Orbitz.com Terms and Conditions, http://www.orbitz.com/pagedeflcontentllegal/ 
terms05.jsp?popupsDisabled=false (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may modifY, revise or update these 
Terms and/or the Privacy Policy, at any time, by updating this posting. You should visit this page from 
time to time to review the then-current Terms, because they are binding on you. Your continued use of 
our site, following the posting of conspicuous notice of any modification, will be subject to the Terms in 
effect at the time of your use. Certain provisions of these Terms may be superseded by expressly 
designated legal notices or terms located on particular pages of this Site."). 
15. E.g., Craigslist.com Terms of Use, http://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use (last visited Mar. 
2, 20 I 0) ("We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to change, modifY or otherwise alter these terms 
and conditions at any time. Such modifications shall become effective immediately upon the posting 
thereof. You must review this agreement on a regular basis to keep yourself apprised of any changes. 
You can find the most recent version of the TOU at: httpJ/www.craigslist.org/about/ 
terms.of.use.html."); Ebay.com User Agreement, httpJ/pages.ebay.comlbelp/policies/user-
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contracts for the sale of new cars. 16 In the event that the manufacturer 
agreement.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may amend this Agreement at any time by posting the 
amended terms on this site. Except as stated elsewhere, all amended terms shall automatically be 
effective 30 days after they are initially posted. Additionally, we will notify you through the eBay 
Message Center. This Agreement may not be otherwise amended except in a writing hand signed by you 
and us. For purposes of this provision, a 'writing' does not include an email message and a signature 
does not include an electronic signature."); Facebook.com Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?re~f (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We can change this Statement 
if we provide you notice (by posting the change on the Facebook Site Governance Page) and an 
opportunity to comment To get notice of any future changes to this Statement, visit our Facebook Site 
Governance Page and become a fan."); Google.com Terms of Service, http://www.google.com/ 
accounts!TOS (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Google may make changes to the Universal Terms or 
Additional Terms from time to time. When these changes are made, Google will make a new copy of the 
Universal Terms available at http://www.google.com/accounts!TOS?hl=en and any new Additional 
Terms will be made available to you from within, or through, the affected Services."); MySpace.com 
Terms of Use Agreement, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfrn?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Mar. 
2, 2010) ("MySpace reserves the right to modify this Agreement at any time and from time to time, and 
each such modification shall be effective upon posting on the MySpace Services. All material 
modifications will apply prospectively only. Your continued use of the MySpace Services following any 
such modification constitutes your agreement to be bound by and your acceptance of the Agreement as 
so modified. It is therefore important that you review this Agreement regularly. If you do not agree to be 
bound by this Agreement and to abide by all Applicable Law, you must discontinue use of the MySpace 
Services immediately. You may receive a copy of this Agreement by contacting us at our Help site."); 
Netflix Terms of Use, http://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) (''Netflix, Inc., 
reserves the right, from time to time, with or without notice to you, to change these Terms of Use in our 
sole and absolute discretion. The most current version of these Terms of Use can be reviewed by 
clicking on the "Terms of Use" located at the bottom of the pages of the Netflix website. The most 
current version of the Terms of Use will supersede all previous versions. You can see changes from 
previous versions of the Terms of Use by clicking here."); PayPal User Agreement, 
http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=xpt!UserAgreement/ua!USUA-outside (last visited Mar. 2, 
2010) ("We may amend this Agreement at any time by posting a revised version on our website. The 
revised version will be effective at the time we post it. In addition, if the revised version includes a 
Substantial Change, we will provide you with 30 Days' prior notice of Substantial Change by posting 
notice on the 'Policy Updates' page of our website."); Twitter Terms of Service, http://twitter.com/tos 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("We may revise these Terms from time to time, the most current version will 
always be at twitter.com/tos. If the revision, in our sole discretion, is material we will notify you via an 
@Twitter update or e-mail to the email associated with your account. By continuing to access or use the 
Services after those revisions become effective, you agree to be bound by the revised Terms."); Xbox 
Live and Games for Windows Live Terms of Use, http://www.xbox.com/en-US!legal!LiveTOU.htrn 
(last visited Mar. 2, 20 I 0) ("If we change this contract, then we will require you to agree to a new 
contract that includes such changes if you want to continue to receive the Service. If you do not want to 
agree to the new contract, you may cancel the Service. Your continued use of the Service will be 
deemed acceptance of and agreement to the new contract."); YouTube Terms of Service, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("YouTube reserves the right to amend these 
Terms of Service at any time and without notice, and it is your responsibility to review these Terms of 
Service for any changes. Your use of the YouTube Website following any amendment of these Terms of 
Service will signify your assent to and acceptance of its revised terms."). 
16. See, e.g., Zeno v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.R.D. 173, 182 (W.O. Pa. 2006) (contract terms stated: 
"Manufacturer has reserved the right to change the design of any new motor vehicle, chassis, accessories 
or parts thereof previously purchased by or shipped to Dealer or being manufactured or sold in 
accordance with Dealer's orders. Correspondingly, in the event of any such change by Manufacturer, 
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raises the price of a car that the consumer has had to order through 
the retailer, the retailer may pass along any price increase imposed on 
the retailer by the manufacturer. 17 
Perhaps the context in which the dominant party's reservation of 
the right to change terms has been most notorious is the employment-
at-will setting. Employers' efforts to adjust the terms of the 
employment "contract" have been subject to judicial review on 
familiar contract law terms. Such litigation has arisen, for example, 
when the employer seeks to adjust retirement benefits,18 bonus 
I 19 . . 20 p ans, or commission rates. 
Dealer shall have no obligation to Buyer to make the same or any similar change in any motor vehicle, 
chassis, accessories or parts thereof covered by this Order either before or subsequent to delivery thereof 
to Buyer."); Samuels v. King Motor Co., 782 So. 2d 489, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (buyer order 
contained the provision: "Manufacturer has reserved the right to change the price to Dealer of new 
motor vehicles without notice. In the event the price to Dealer of new motor vehicles of the series and 
body type ordered hereunder is changed by Manufacturer prior to delivery of the new motor vehicle 
ordered hereunder to Purchaser, Dealer reserves the right to change the price of unit of such motor 
vehicle to purchaser accordingly."). 
17. See. e.g., Samuels, 782 So. 2d at 493; GM Special Vehicle Manufacturer Converters Agreement, 
http://agreements.realdealdocs.com/Manufacturing-Agreement/SPECIAL-VEHICLE-
MANUFACTURER-CONVERTER8-2314980/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Prices and other terms of 
sale applicable to Vehicles are those set forth in GMPricing.com. Such prices may be changed by GM at 
any time."). 
Unilateral change-of-terms provisions also appear in non-consumer contracts, even beyond the 
banking context. The legal research services, LexisNexis and Westlaw, reserve the right to unilaterally 
change the terms of their contracts with subscribers. See LexisNexis Terms and Conditions of Use, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/terms/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("Modifications to Terms of Use. Provider 
reserves the right to change these Terms of Use at any time. Updated versions of the Terms of Use will 
appear on this Web Site and are effective immediately. You are responsible for regularly reviewing the 
Terms of Use. Continued use of this Web Site after any such changes constitutes your consent to such 
changes."); Westlaw Terms of Use, http://west.thomson.com/about/terms-of-use/default.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2010) ("All use of this website, including all content, information, and services provided 
on this website, is subject to the following terms of use ('Terms'), which constitute a legal agreement 
between you and West. By accessing, browsing, or using this website, you acknowledge that you have 
read, understood, and agree to be bound by these Terms. We may update these Terms at any time, 
without notice to you. Each time you access this website, you agree to be bound by the Terms then in 
effect."). 
18. See, e.g., Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Int'l Union v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684,688 
(3d Cir. 1949) (upholding defendant's actions that were pursuant to contract which included provisions, 
such as, "The company ... reserves the right to modify, cancel or terminate [the retirement] plan or any 
part thereof at any time, which right shall include the right to cancel, terminate or decrease pensions 
already granted .. .. "). 
19. See. e.g., Isla Verde Hotel Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 702 F.2d 268,269 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(holding unilaterally canceling Christmas bonus violated the National Labor Relations Act); Nat') Labor 
Relations Bd. v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964). 
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In this article we consider the operation of unilateral change-of-
terms provisions in the context of consumer protection legislation, 
commercial legislation generally, and the common law of contract. 
There is something about such terms that rankles. It seems as though 
the mechanics of contract-provision of a term to which the parties 
ostensibly "agree"-are being manipulated to take advantage of the 
fact that standard-form contractual documents, pretty much by 
definition, are irrational to read.21 Typical unilateral change-of-terms 
clauses are generally buried in the boilerplate of form "agreements" 
that the weaker contracting party could not understand even if she 
were disposed to read it and, therefore, it would be irrational for her 
to read it. Further, the argument that somehow the terms of such 
forms are policed by the marketplace has been cast into doubt 
because it is unwise to undermine the consensual nature of contract 
with fictions that would rely on dubious economic analysis.22 
So, in response to the apparent acceptance of the now-ubiquitous 
unilateral change-of-terms clauses, we offer an overview of their use 
and something of a primer for courts to consider in ruling on the 
enforceability of the clauses and the changes made pursuant to 
them.23 We are not comfortable with their presumptive enforceability 
20. See, e.g., Schappert V. cere Int'l, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Hathaway v. General 
Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1986) (holding that company could not unilaterally alter commission 
rates because they did not notify employee). 
21 . See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-3, at 37 (6th ed. 
20 I 0) ("Many sales contracts are not fully bargained, not carefully drafted, and not understandingly 
signed ... by both parties."). 
22. Clayton Gillette suggests forms are policed by the marketplace. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling 
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 679, 683 [hereinafter Gillette, Rolling] (An offeree 
who does not assent to terms should be considered to have accepted them if "his or her interests are 
sufficiently, if imperfectly, represented by other parties or institutions that are inextricably involved in 
the creation of contract terms"). Other scholars disagree with that proposition because of the irrationality 
of reading forms. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1527, 1513 (2007) ("A 
guerilla term is a provision in a form contract that takes advantage of 'rational ignorance'-the 
irrationality of reading terms in forms ... (and] it is not in rational form drafters' interest to bring 
(guerilla terms] to the attention of less sophisticated consumers .... "); Yannis Bakos, Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics 
Approach to Standard Form Contracts, NYU CENTER FOR L. EcoN. & ORG., Oct. 2009, available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=l443256. CfCharles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for 
Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 95 (2006). 
23. For other contemporary treatment of change-of-terms clauses, see On:n Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, 
Empty Promises, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. XXX (2010), and two recent student notes. Eric Andrew Horwitz, 
Note, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Services Contracts of Adhesion, 
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and, instead, believe there is good reason to presume that they are 
unenforceable, 24 just as are disparate terms exchanged in the 
formation of a sales contract under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC or the Code).25 We understand 
that the better rule under the Code's "battle ofthe forms" provision is 
that disparate terms proffered by each party are "knocked out," with 
the parties' contract consisting of the terms upon which the writings 
agree as well as other commercially reasonable supplementary terms 
provided by commercial context and the Code. 
Our analysis, then, will begin in Part I with consideration of how 
Article 2 jurisprudence might inform our conclusions about the 
enforceability of unilateral change-of-terms provisions. There are 
several sections of the sales article that concern the scope of risk 
adjustment over the course of a contractual relationship and impose 
limitations on such adjustment in terms that might pertain as well to 
the enforceability of change-of-terms provisions in contracts not 
within the scope of Article 2. 
Part II will survey apposite "consumer protection" legislation, both 
federal and state. The state versions of this legislation generally 
concern credit card agreements, and may perhaps best be appreciated 
as the product of the "race to the bottom": the competition among 
states eager to attract lucrative credit card business. The object of this 
legislation is to permit the banks that issue credit cards to export the 
law of the enabling states and thereby impose unilateral change-of-
terms provisions on residents of all states. The recent federal credit 
card legislation may best be appreciated as push-back on such efforts. 
Finally, Part III will survey apposite common law principles that 
might shed light on the enforceability of change-of-terms provisions 
and the enforceability of changes made pursuant to those provisions. 
The best way to appreciate the potential application and operation of 
these principles is in relation to the object of contract generally, an 
15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 75 (2006); Daniel Watkins, Note, Terms Subject to Change: Assent and 
Unconscionability in Contracts that Contemplate Amendment, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 545 (2009). 
24. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173 
(1983) (terms in standard-form contracts of adhesion should be viewed as presumptively unenforceable). 
25. u.c.c. § 2-207 (2002). 
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object that could be obscured by the mechanics of doctrine that may 
be too easily manipulated. 
I. THE CODE ANALOGY 
The scope of Article 2 of the UCC is limited to sales of goods. 
Article 2A, governing much of the law of personal property leases, is 
by its terms limited to certain bailments for hire of the same subject 
matter. There may be nothing unique about "goods" qua goods so far 
as the application of particular contract conceptions are concerned; 
indeed, we may understand the fact that Articles 2 and 2A are limited 
in their scope by reference to their subject matter as a reflection of 
political or even economic rather than jurisprudential forces. That is, 
whatever contract accomplishes, it is not always obvious that the 
Article 2 or 2A iteration of the rule would not apply well beyond the 
sale or lease context.26 
In recognition of that fact, courts have often relied on those two 
articles of the Code as the source of helpful analogy. 27 The sales and 
lease articles of the UCC would only apply by analogy to most of the 
contexts considered in this article because most of the transactions 
involve the provision of services or contractual relationships within 
the scope of other state or federal legislation, such as Article 4 of the 
vee and complementary federal legislation governing the bank-
customer relationship. But Article 2, and by extension those portions 
of Article 2A based on the sales article, constitutes an important 
jurisprudential statement concerning contract formation and 
adjustment dynamics. The analogy to the perspective flrst offered in 
26. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts draws heavily on Article 2 for the Restatement's 
articulation of rules generally applicable to all kinds of contracts. 
27. See, e.g., 21st Century Props. Co. v. Carpenter Insulation & Coatings Co., 694 F. Supp. 148, 151 
n.2 (D. Md. 1988) (stating that "roofs (because of their immovable nature) ... are not 'goods ' within the 
meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code[,]'' however, "it is appropriate to use the warranty provisions 
of the Code . . . by analogy'' (emphasis added)); Hoffman v. Horton, 186 S.E.2d 79, 80 (Va. 1972) 
(holding that the sale of land is not governed by the UCC, "[h]owever, while the Uniform Commercial 
Code is not controlling here, [the court] think[s] it appropriate to borrow from [the UCC] to establish the 
rule applicable to the transaction at hand"); Olmstead v. Mulder, 863 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1993) (holding that the sale of real estate is not governed by the UCC, but ''the reasoning of the UCC on 
the disclaimer of warranties is persuasive and can be applied by analogy in this case"( emphasis added)). 
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1110 2009-2010
1110 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 26:4 
Article 2, therefore, may be apt. There is not an immediately obvious 
reason why the formation and adjustment rules should proceed from 
different jurisprudential premises outside of Article 2 than they 
would within the uniform sales law. 
We must also keep in mind, however, that all analogies are, at least 
in part, inherently fallacious. The legislature could have chosen to 
apply the Article 2 rules beyond their scope directly, so that courts 
need not have relied on arguments by analogy. But by and large, the 
legislatures have not extended the rules of Article 2 to other contexts, 
so perhaps we cannot assume identity between the transactional, 
economic, and policy bases supporting Article 2 and those supporting 
the more general contract law. There should, though, be good reason 
for any dissonance. 
Six arguably apposite Article 2 rules in particular provide sources 
of analogy; and each is considered in the subsections that follow: 
open-price terms,28 output and requirements contracts,29 a party's 
right to specify particular terms,30 "battle of the forms,"31 
modification,32 and failure of an exclusive remedy to achieve its 
essential purpose. 33 Some of those provisions will more obviously 
and directly pertain to issues such as those that arise in the unilateral 
change-of-terms setting, but all, we submit, present analyses that 
respond to the same or sufficiently similar transactional and 
theoretical tensions. 
A. Open Price Terms 
Section 2-305 of the Code recognizes that "[t]he parties if they so 
intend may conclude a contract for sale even if the price is not 
settled. "34 The object of the provision is to give effect to the intent of 
the contracting parties, not to endorse one party's (i.e., the dominant 
28. u.c.c. § 2-305 (2002). 
29. /d. § 2-306. 
30. !d. § 2-311. 
31. /d. § 2-207. 
32. /d. § 2-209. 
33. !d. § 2-719. 
34. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2002). UCC Article 2A, however, lacks an analogous provision. 
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party's) imposition of all of the risk of price fluctuation on the other. 
The comments make clear that whether the parties actually intended a 
deal notwithstanding their failure to include a certain price is "a 
question to be determined by the trier of fact."35 Further, the black 
letter of the provision contemplates the situation in which the contract 
provides that one party, seller or buyer, will fix the price: "A price to 
be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in 
good faith."36 And in the case of a merchant, "good faith" is 
measured by reference to objective indicia. 37 There is no reason to 
assume that there would be any difference between a contract that 
leaves price open but to be set in the future by one of the contracting 
parties, and a contract that fixes a price at the outset subject to 
adjustment at the instance of one or the other contracting parties. 
Not all unilateral change-of-terms provisions expressly concern 
price, but all contract terms concern risk, and risk is just the flip side 
of price. 38 But § 2-305 is an important statement, even in cases where 
the price of the contract subject matter is not directly at issue. First, 
note the context in which the provision would operate: between likely 
sophisticated contracting parties with the actual intent to leave the 
price term open. 39 The most obvious reason why the parties would 
choose to leave such risk "unfixed" is that they each have been able 
to hedge their bets on price, perhaps by entering into offsetting 
contracts with other contracting counterparties. Alternatively, a party 
35. Id. § 2-305 cmt. 2 ("Under some circumstances the postponement of agreement on price will 
mean that no deal has really been concluded, and this is made express in the preamble of subsection (I) 
('The parties if they so intend') and in subsection ( 4). Whether or not this is so is, in most cases, a 
question to be determined by the trier of fact.") (emphasis in original). 
36. /d. § 2-305(2). 
37. See id. § 2-305 cmt. 3 (rejecting the "uncommercial idea" that the seller may subjectively "fix 
any price he may wish"). 
38. See Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1978). 
39. Under U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(a}-(c) (2002), the parties may intend to leave the price term open if 
"nothing is said as to price," "the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree," or "the 
price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard ... . "See, e.g., Arbitron, Inc. v. 
Tralyn Broad., Inc., 400 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005) (radio-listener demographics service/radio broadcaster 
intended to leave the price open); Gage Prods Co. v. Henkel Corp., 393 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(chemical suppliers failed to agree on a price); Flagler Auto., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 582 F. Supp. 
2d 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (gasoline supplier/retailers intended to leave the price open); Offices Togolais 
Des Phosphates v. Mulberry Phosphates, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (phosphate rock 
seller/buyer said nothing about price). 
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might not be concerned about a fixed price because that party is a 
middleman, confident of the ability to pass on price increases to sub-
buyers or to those for whom the contracting party performs services 
on a cost-plus basis. 
Section 2-305 also contemplates that the courts may fix a 
reasonable price if the party empowered by the contract to do so fails 
to do so in good faith. In that event, the court will fix a "reasonable" 
price.40 Of course, that presumes that the premise of§ 2-305 has been 
satisfied: the parties intended to conclude a contract even though the 
price was not settled at the time of contracting. Section 2-204 would 
be the measure of that intent. That section provides that a contract 
may be formed so long as the parties "intend" to contract and the 
court can ascertain a reasonably certain basis for granting relief in the 
event one of the contracting parties fails to perform.41 So a court 
could always invalidate the operation of a price escalation, or any 
unilateral change-of-terms provision if the court concludes either that 
the parties did not intend to provide the dominant party such 
unilateral power or that the uncertainty of the "contract" terms 
obscured any reasonable basis for granting relief. It would depend 
upon the circumstances of the parties at the time the court invalidated 
the agreement, but it might well be the case that the court winds up 
eviscerating what the dominant party thought was a contract, and 
eviscerating with it what the dominant party thought its contract 
rights to be. The prospect of this occurrence might have sufficient in 
terrorrem effect to discourage the dominant party from pushing too 
hard on the unilateral right to change terms. 
The § 2-305 recognition of contract when one party has reserved 
the right to set a term as significant as price is consistent with a 
conception of contract that would recognize the enforceability of a 
unilateral change-of-terms provision. The Code's deference to open-
price terms and their completion in a commercially reasonable 
manner would also support, by analogy, the enforceability of those 
40. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, at 134 ("When there is a gap, 2-305 directs the court to 
determine 'a reasonable price,' provided the parties intended to contract."). 
41. u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (2002). 
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provisions in contracts not within the scope of the Code.42 What 
remains, though, is to determine whether the limitations that the Code 
would impose on the enforcement of such provisions should also 
pertain in the contemporary contexts in which the party insisting 
upon the unilateral change-of-terms clause would exercise it, and 
how the Code limitations might operate in the non-Code contexts. 
Although § 2-305 relies on conceptions of "good faith," given the 
vagueness of that conception, it is worthwhile to track its operation in 
parallel provisions. 
B. Output and Requirements Contracts 
The quantity term of a contract may be important,43 but it is not 
crucial that the contract specify a precise quantity for the contract to 
be enforceable. What is indispensable is the quantity measure. If the 
court has the means to determine how the parties intended to fix their 
performance obligation, in terms of quantity, then the court may well 
be able to ascertain a reasonably certain basis to grant relief.44 
Section 2-306 recognizes the enforceability of contracts in which 
the quantity is measured by reference to either the buyer's needs (or 
"requirements") or the seller's capacity to produce (or "output"). The 
Code here formulates a rule recognized as well in the common law45 
and again relies on the parties' bona fides to determine the extent of 
enforceability: "A term which measures the quantity by the output of 
the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output 
or requirements as may occur in good faith[.]'.46 The comment makes 
clear that although the precise quantity to be transferred pursuant to 
the contract is not certain, the measure is certain, and, more pertinent 
42. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt e (1981) ("Similar principles (to those 
found in UCC § 2-305] apply to contracts for the rendition of service."). 
43. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. I (2002) (explaining that, under the statute of frauds, "[t]he only term 
which must appear [in the record of the transaction] is the quantity term ... "). 
44. See id. § 2-204 cmt. 3. 
45. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 4-9, at 173 (citing In reUnited Cigar Stores Co., 8 F. 
Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), affd, 72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1934); Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 
589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
46. u.c.c. § 2-306(1) (2002). 
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for present analogical purposes, not within the sole control or 
discretion of either party. 
Under this Article, a contract for output or requirements is not 
too indefinite since it is held to mean the actual good faith output 
or requirements of the particular party. Nor does such a contract 
lack mutuality of obligation since, under this section, the party 
who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant or 
conduct his business in good faith and according to commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade so that his output or 
requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.47 
Note that the comment explains why such provisions are not infirm 
as a matter of common law contract doctrine: because the constraint 
on the party's performance obligation assures that there is mutuality 
of obligation. Without mutuality of obligation, there can be no 
contract.48 So it is telling that § 2-306, a Code provision that 
accommodates the parties' filling in a performance term after the 
fact, relies on "commercial standards of fair dealing" to police 
completion of the term. There is mutuality because discretion is 
limited by forces outside of the control of the party who would 
complete the quantity term.49 
Unilateral change-of-terms provisions, in contrast, could not 
identify any similar constraint on the dominant party's discretion, 
leaving the contract open to the charge that it lacks the mutuality of 
obligation that is crucial to contract. 50 So a court could rely upon the 
§ 2-306 reference to mutuality and "commercial standards of fair 
dealing" as a means to police, if not invalidate entirely, the dominant 
party's imposition of a term that shifts the risk of a contract in a 
47. /d. § 2-306 cmt. 2. 
48. I FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS§ 3.2 (3d ed. 2004); 25 RICHARD A. LoRD, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS§ 67:42 (4th ed. 2009). Cf CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS§ 4.12 (6th ed. 2009) 
("The doctrine is not one of mutuality of obligation but rather one of mutuality of consideration."). 
49. Accord REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34 cmt. b {1981) ("(L]imits on the power (to 
select the terms of performance] may be either express or implied. Often the choice must reasonable in 
the circumstances."). 
50. See Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
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manner prejudicial to the weaker party's interest. And insofar as the 
mutuality basis of contract is implicated, it would not seem that prior 
"agreement" could overcome that analysis, ostensible "intent" 
notwithstanding. 
But if that construction of the impact of § 2-306 on the mutuality 
calculus is to bear the weight that might matter in the case of 
unilateral change-of-terms provisions, then the Code would need to 
be consistent with regard to limitations on one contracting party's 
reservation of a right to unilaterally change the terms of the 
agreement. Section 2-311, too, concerns this analysis and may inform 
our understanding of the Code's disposition toward unilateral 
changes of terms. 
C. Party's Right to Specify Particular Terms 
Section 2-311 of the Code recognizes the commercial desirability, 
if not necessity, of providing the contracting parties with the 
flexibility to respond to transactional exigencies without 
compromising the enforceability of their deal. Sometimes the best 
response to uncertainty is to live with it until some point in time 
when it must be resolved, and then to let one of the contracting 
parties rather than the other resolve it. So long as the discretion of the 
party empowered to resolve the uncertainty is constrained in some 
meaningful way, contract law's interest in certain allocation of risk is 
not compromised. That is the balance struck by § 2-311, which 
provides: 
1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite 
(subsection (3) of 2-204) to be a contract is not made invalid by 
the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to be specified 
by one of the parties. Any such specification must be made in 
good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness. 51 
51. u.c.c. § 2-311(1)(2002). 
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That subsection imposes three threshold limitations on the parties' 
ability to reserve to one of them the unilateral power to adjust the 
terms of the contract. First, only "particulars of performance" may be 
the subject of post hoc determination. Second, the discretion to 
specify is constrained by good faith and commercial reasonableness. 
And third, an implicit limitation: the particulars may be "specified." 
Such "specification" would seem to be something short of a unilateral 
power to change the terms of the parties' agreement. The section 
insulates the contract from what would otherwise be the effect of a 
reservation of right to specify particulars: an unenforceable 
agreement. Still, though, an agreement that would not be enforceable 
on account of such a post hoc right to specify is not deemed 
enforceable just because of the existence of that right to specify. 
Further, it would seem that insofar as the other subsections of 
2-311, as well as the comments thereto, intimate something about the 
limits of the right to specify, those limitations may also constrain the 
provision's scope. Subsection (2) provides a gap filler in the absence 
of contrary agreement with regard to assortment of goods (at buyer's 
option) and shipment arrangements (at seller's option). Note that both 
of those options concern matters that must be resolved in order to 
determine the scope of the counterparty's performance. The seller 
cannot tender conforming goods unless someone specifies the 
assortment; and the buyer cannot acquire the goods unless someone 
makes arrangements for their shipment to the buyer. Neither option 
provides the dominant contracting party the unilateral right to change 
the terms of an existing performance obligation imposed on the other. 
Indeed, any shifting of risk would seem to be incidental. In fact, were 
it not, that might constitute a sufficient basis to conclude that the 
right to specify goes beyond mere particulars. 
Subsection (3) further reinforces the conclusion that it is in the 
interest of one party to leave specification of particulars to the other. 
The subsection contemplates that the parties have left a specification 
of particulars to be resolved by one party in order to accommodate 
the performance of both. So if the party who is to specify fails to do 
so, the counterparty is excused for any delay in its own performance 
and may treat the failure to specify as a breach. It should be clear that 
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the provision contemplates a type of specification wholly unlike a 
dominant contracting party's imposition of an increased price or a 
change of the terms of performance on the subordinate contracting 
party. 
The bottom line, then, so far as § 2-311's pertinence to our coming 
to terms with unilateral change-of-terms provisions is concerned, 
would seem to be that the Code provision contemplates and provides 
the guidance to help us work through gaps that the parties have 
intentionally left in their agreements. 52 The provision does not 
support a change of terms as much as it recognizes the parties' ability 
to leave a gap and not render the "contract" illusory or unenforceable 
because of indefiniteness. 53 
Although § 2-311 provides guidance when the parties have 
intentionally left "gaps" in their agreement to be completed by one of 
them prior to or in the course of performance, perhaps the most 
familiar (if not most notorious) Code provision enforcing a deal 
beyond the terms of the parties' explicit agreement is the so-called 
"battle of the forms" provision, which, like § 2-311, relaxes common 
law premises of contract formation and goes beyond § 2-311 by 
providing the means to complete the deal even when the parties did 
not contemplate that means of completion. 
D. "Battle of the Forms" 
Section 2-207 of the Code concerns "forms," and "forms" is 
certainly a term of art used to designate those writings that are 
irrational to read. When the parties exchange disparate forms, they 
may well intend to contract and are more concerned with the fact of 
contract than they are with the terms that would govern their 
reciprocal undertakings. This is not the place to reproduce the rich 
52. To similar effect is the Restatement: "The terms of a contract may be reasonably certain even 
though it empowers one or both parties to make a selection of terms in the course of performance." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34( I) ( 1981 ). 
53 . I LINDA J. RUSCH, HAWKLAND UCC SERIES§ 2-311 : I, at 2-488 (Frederick H. Miller ed., 2002). 
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scholarly investigations of§ 2-207,54 to which many legal scholars 
(though not your authors) may well owe their tenure; suffice it to say 
that the interstices of the provision have been subject to exhaustive 
analyses and after the dust has settled, and we can have some 
confidence that it has settled, the better view seems quite 
straightforward: if two parties exchange forms that include disparate 
terms, the court will enforce a contract between them on the terms 
upon which the forms agree as well as supplementary terms fixed by 
course of performance, course of dealing, usage of trade, 55 and Code 
"gap fillers. "56 The Code is not as concerned with the specific terms 
of the parties' forms because the parties themselves, by relying on 
forms, evidence a lack of concern about those specific terms. 57 To 
permit one party to prevail over the other by operation of some 
mechanical rule, such as a "last shot rule,"58 would actually be to 
frustrate the parties' true rather than merely formal intention. 
For present purposes, § 2-207 is important because of what it does 
not have to say about a dominant party's unilateral right to change the 
terms of a contract. At first impression, it might seem that the Code's 
treatment of the battle of the forms supports the enforcement of 
unilateral change-of-terms clauses. If the Code can essentially write a 
contract for parties who have not been sufficiently scrupulous in 
completing the terms for themselves, it might seem entirely 
consistent to recognize that one of the parties can permit the other 
party to complete the terms of a contract. If there may be sufficient 
54. For a thorough critique of the "battle of the forms" under section 2-207, see Comeill A. 
Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep It Simple, Stupid, II LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 233 
(2007). 
55. U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2003). For definitions of these terms, see id. § l-303(a)--(c). The subsections 
form a hierarchy, with course of performance preferred to course of dealing, and course of dealing 
preferred to usage of trade. /d.§ 1-303(e). 
56. See, e.g ., id. § 2-305 (price); id § 2-306 (quantity); id § 2-307 (manner of delivery). 
57. See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1580 (lOth Cir. 1984)("1be provision seems 
drafted with a recognition of the reality that merchants seldom review exchanged forms with the 
scrutiny of lawyers."); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Elkem Mgmt, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 468 (W.O. Pa. 1998); 
Richardson v. Union Carbide Indus. Gases, Inc. , 790 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); 
Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628 (R.I. 1998); see also Stephens, supra 
note 54. 
58. Under the common law last shot rule, "the terms of the party who sent the last form, typically the 
seller, would become the terms of the parties's [sic) contract." Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 
939 F.2d 91 , 99 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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intent to contract to permit § 2-207 to operate, is there not also 
sufficient intent when the subordinate party by contract permits the 
dominant party to unilaterally change terms? 
In a word, "no." It is one thing to recognize the commercial 
viability, even desirability, of a court's completing a contract by 
reference to rules that sophisticated parties or their counsel should be 
expected to anticipate; it is wholly another to accommodate one 
sophisticated party's corruption of contracting principles to impose 
what may be an unconscientious bargain on the other at the time 
when that subordinate party is in no position to defend itself. In other 
words, far from being an elaboration of contract principles 
recognized by § 2-207, the unilateral change-of-terms provision is a 
corruption of the very foundations of the Code "battle of the forms" 
rules. For the reasons § 2-207 makes good sense and is consistent 
with contract principles, unilateral change-of-terms provisions are a 
corruption of those same principles. A court construing a unilateral 
change-of-terms provision, therefore, should not be swayed by 
arguments by analogy to 2-207. The analogy is fallacious; and 
argument based on that fallacious analogy should be rejected. 
Indeed, to the extent that reference to 2-207 is helpful in 
considering the enforceability of unilateral change-of-terms 
provisions, the better reasoned argument would seem to be that the 
Code's "battle of the forms" rules militate in favor of finding such 
provisions unenforceable for the same reason that disparate terms in 
exchanged forms are unenforceable. Recall that if the buyer's and 
seller's forms conflict, the better reading of § 2-207 counsels that 
both parties' terms should be "knocked out."59 That result obtains 
because the fact of the terms' dissonance confirms that neither party 
intended to contract on the terms proffered by its counterparty. Of 
that we may be certain. Similarly, insofar as the dominant contracting 
party uses the unilateral change-of-terms provision at a time when the 
subordinate party is unable to extricate itself from the contract, this 
should as well intimate that there was no intent to contract on the 
terms as amended and probably no intent ab initio to agree to the 
59. See Stephens, supra note 54, at 249. 
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unilateral change either.60 Insofar as § 2-207, then, is about enforcing 
a real rather than formal intent to contract; the correct reading of the 
provision militates in favor of refusing to enforce a unilateral change-
of-terms provision unless there is evidence of real intent to contract 
by operation of such a term. 
The same factual predicate that supports the operation of§ 2-207 
may also, and this can be a matter of framing or perception, raise 
contract modification issues. Although § 2-207 tells us what the 
terms of a contract are, another provision, § 2-209, tells us how those 
terms may be modified by the parties' communications and behavior 
subsequent to formation. Professors White and Summers describe 
how the coincidence may arise: 
Suppose buyer sends a purchase order. Seller sends an 
acknowledgment that includes a warranty and disclaimer. The 
disclaimer "materially alters" under 2-207(2). Later, with 
knowledge of the warranty and disclaimer, the buyer 
acknowledges the disclaimer. Does it then become part of the 
contract (as a modification) under 2-209(1)? Some courts have 
said "yes!"61 
Whether the facts raise a formation or modification issue may be a 
matter of timing. Whatever the resolution of tension between the two 
provisions, they should both reflect the same disposition toward the 
formation calculus. 
E. Modification 
At least in the first instance, modification of an existing contract 
depends upon the same formalities as does original formation of the 
contract. So the rules governing both formation and modification 
60. It is dangerous to infer the subordinate party's intent to agree to unilateral amendments by 
relying on market forces to correct for consumer mistakes. See Alces, supra note 22; Oren Bar-Gill, The 
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008). Contra Gillette, Rolling, 
supra note 22; Richard Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 
803 (2008). 
61. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, §2-3, at42-43. 
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should be parallel. That does not mean that they need to be the same; 
but it does mean that variation between them should track distinctions 
that make a difference. Or so the story goes. Section 2-209, though, 
does not-at least at first blush-seem to remain true to that 
objective. We might imagine that the drafters of Article 2, 
particularly Karl Llewellyn, were somewhat impatient with formation 
formalities that could more often than not frustrate rather than serve 
transactors' interests and, so, just as § 2-207 relaxes formation rules 
in the case of communications it is irrational for the parties to read, § 
2-209 overcomes similar (and similarly inefficacious) obstacles to 
commerce. 
Section 2-209 does make it easier for the parties to modify their 
contract and does so principally by eliminating any vestige of the 
consideration requirement the common law would recognize. In place 
of consideration, the provision relies on intent and good faith. 
Although a modification need not be supported by consideration in 
order to be enforceable, the parties must have intended to modify 
their agreement and must have acted in good faith. The good faith 
requirement may be redundant given § 1-304,62 which imposes a 
pervasive good faith requirement with regard to the performance and 
enforcement of every contract or duty within the Code, if 
modification amounts to "performance or enforcement." So the 
principal contribution of§ 2-209 is the abrogation of any independent 
consideration requirement. Although Article 2 still requires that 
consideration support contracts within its scope-there must be a 
"sale"63 --consideration is not required in the case of modifications to 
that original contract. 
A dominant contracting party's use of a unilateral right to change 
the terms of a contract seems to be at least akin to a modification of 
the underlying contract. Of course, one could argue, and perhaps do 
so convincingly, that exercise of rights under such a term does not 
62. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003). 
63. A "sale" under Article 2 "consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002). This definition of "sale" satisfies the requirement that a contract be supported 
by mutuality of consideration. The seller suffers detriment by giving up the title to his goods, and the 
buyer suffers detriment by paying the seller's price. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1122 2009-2010
1122 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol 26:4 
modify the contract because provision of the right in the original 
contract form obviates any need to modify. Indeed, that is just what 
the unilateral change-of-terms provision is for: it provides the party 
with the right to exercise the ability to change the terms of the 
contract without actually "modifying" the contract and having to go 
through the contract hoops required to effect a modification. It may 
be, then, that we should not expect symmetry between modification 
and exercise of a right under a unilateral change-of-terms provision. 
From another perspective, though, it may make sense to police the 
operation of a unilateral change-of-terms provision just as we would 
police modification of an existing contract. After all, from the 
perspective of the subordinate party, the effect is the same: the 
dominant party's exercise of the unilateral change-of-terms clause 
effects a modification of (i.e., an increase in) the subordinate party's 
performance or payment obligation or a modification of (i.e., 
reduction in) the dominant party's obligation.64 From the perspective 
of contract doctrine, though, the difference may be significant. 
Although a party from whom a modification is sought still has the 
ability to decline, the party against whom a unilateral change-of-
terms clause operates has purportedly contracted away that 
prerogative. So the safeguards that protect a subordinate party from 
an overreaching or otherwise undesirable bilateral modification are 
not present when the modification is made by the dominant party 
pursuant to a unilateral change-of-terms clause. If the risks of 
dominant-party overreaching are the same in the two settings, it is not 
clear that the formal distinction should make a real difference. 
So the approach of§ 2-209 may help here. Recall that in place of 
new consideration, § 2-209 requires "good faith." Although it is not 
necessary that a modification be supported by new consideration to 
be enforceable, it is necessary that the modification be sought in good 
faith. So if the dominant party were to use duress, that could 
invalidate the modification obtained. "The effective use of bad faith 
to escape performance on the original contract terms is barred, and 
64. Examples of a reduction in the dominant party's obligation include a reduction in the amount of 
credit to be extended or a reduction in the services (e.g., cable TV channels) to be provided. 
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the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial 
reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith."65 
Professors White and Summers have described the transactional 
dynamic that could reveal the type of extortion that would render a 
modification unenforceable: 
The extortionist is perhaps most familiar: "Pay me more or I 
won't finish making the goods and you won't be able to open up 
your new business on the scheduled date." The seller may thus 
get the buyer over a barrel and extort a higher price or some 
other concession. The wrong is aggravated if the extortionist 
insists on concessions that it sought but did not get in the 
negotiations leading up to the contract in the first place. . . . 
Courts can hold that they are in bad faith under 1-203[66] or 
unconscionable under 2-302, or invalid under the common law of 
duress via 1-103.67 
White and Summers' ultimate conclusion is that "[t]here will be 
plenty of hard cases here; more than most of these depend on a priori 
moral judgments about what is fair and what is not."68 That also 
would seem to resonate with the unilateral change-of-terms calculus 
as well. 
Just as modification may be a fair and appropriate response to a 
change of circumstances not contemplated by the parties at the time 
of contract formation, a contract provision included and relied upon 
by the parties in the course of their performance may lead to results 
inconsistent with the parties' best intentions. The Code provides 
courts with a means to police such "terms gone wrong" and, as with 
modifications, the Code approach may provide guidance as to the 
best resolution of analogous problems with the operation of unilateral 
change-of-terms clauses. 
65. U.C.C. § 2-209 crnt. 2, para. 2 (2002). 
66. In Revised Article I, this provision is now located in U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003). 
67. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 2-7, at 81. 
68. !d. at 59-60. 
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F. Failure of an Exclusive Remedy to Achieve Its Essential Purpose 
If a seller of goods can fix with some certainty the post-delivery 
risk to which it is exposed, the seller can more accurately price the 
goods. Thus the Code recognizes and gives effect to a contract term 
that stipulates the remedy in the event of the seller's breach, generally 
a breach of warranty. Section 2-719 explains that: 
(1) ... (a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to 
or in substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit 
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, 
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and 
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts; and 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to 
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in 
this Act.69 
A large proportion of both consumer and commercial sales contracts 
contain a provision making repair or replacement the buyer's 
exclusive remedy for the seller's breach of warranty. This provision 
effectively limits the buyer's remedies, unless the repair-or-replace 
remedy fails of its essential purpose. 70 The pertinent part of § 2-719, 
so far as the enforceability of unilateral change-of-terms clauses 
should be concerned, is the invalidation of the limited remedy when 
circumstances cause it to "fail of its essential purpose." If a change-
of-terms clause provides that the subordinate party may avoid 
operation of the change by discharging her outstanding obligations to 
the dominant party, the situation is analogous to a sales contract with 
an exclusive remedy for breach of warranty. The subordinate party 
has a "remedy'' for the dominant party's specification of an 
undesirable term: escape from the transaction upon payment for the 
69. u.c.c. § 2-719 (2002). 
70. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 21, § 13-10, at 604 (citing Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 
670 (5th Cir. 1971 )). 
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performance rendered by the dominant party up to that point. But 
factors outside the contracted-for performance may make this remedy 
illusory: the subordinate party may not have the resources to 
accelerate a performance that the contract contemplates will be 
performed over an extended period of time, or termination of the 
contract may entail a forfeiture. 71 To be told that you can resist a 
price increase by immediately paying all amounts outstanding may 
effectively constrain you to "agree" to the price increase. So in a very 
real way, the "essential purpose" of that option has failed. 
The power of the unilateral change-of-terms clause in continuing 
contractual relationships is in the dominant party's ability to exercise 
the clause when the subordinate party is impotent to avoid the 
consequences of its operation. So it is in fact somewhat tautological 
to acknowledge the prejudice that operation of the clause entails: 
prejudice is the point. To the extent that the limited "remedy" (recall, 
this is analogy}--the ability to extricate oneself from the continuing 
contract-does not fail of its essential purpose, the unilateral change-
of-terms clause has no leverage. As long as the dominant party 
maintains leverage, it does so precisely because that limited 
"remedy" is of no practical use to the subordinate party. 
A court reviewing the operation of a unilateral change-of-terms 
provision, then, should be sensitive to the practical ramifications of 
the subordinate party's exercising an option available to it in order to 
avoid the effect of the change of terms. If the subordinate party, as a 
practical matter, would be impotent to avoid the operation of the 
clause, then the court should find the dominant party's exercise of the 
clause to be no more appropriate than would be a dominant party's 
reliance on a limited remedy clause when that exclusive remedy has 
"failed of its essential purpose." 
71. E.g., Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (loss of cell phone and 
phone number). 
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II. STATUTORY REGULATION OF CHANGE-OF-TERMS CLAUSES 
Part I explored several provisions in the UCC, applicable to both 
commercial and consumer contracts, which authorize and constrain 
the use of contract terms that empower one of the parties to set the 
initial terms of their contract. The next two parts turn more 
specifically to terms that authorize one of the parties to change the 
initial terms of the contract. This Part addresses the legislative and 
administrative treatment of change-of-terms provisions, primarily in 
the context of open-end credit. Part III addresses common law 
doctrine that applies to all kinds of contracts. 
In the context of consumer credit, the Truth in Lending Act72 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as TILA) recognizes the use of 
change-of-terms clauses. As a disclosure statute, TILA neither 
expressly validates the practice nor imposes standards for the 
exercise of the power granted by change-of-terms clauses. The 
regulation promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board73 also does not 
do so, although it does recognize their use. Section 226.9(c) of 
Regulation Z provides: 
(1) Written notice required. Whenever any term required to be 
disclosed . . . is changed . . . , the creditor shall mail or deliver 
written notice of the change to each consumer who may be 
affected. The notice shall be mailed or delivered at least 15 days 
prior to the effective date of the change. The 15-day timing 
requirement does not apply if the change has been agreed to by 
the consumer, or if a periodic rate or other finance charge is 
increased because of the consumer's delinquency or default; the 
72. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1700 (2006). 
73. Section 105 provides: ''The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this 
subchapter." Truth in Lending Act § 105(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006). The Board has promulgated 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.48 (2009), and has issued the Official Staff Commentary, id supp. I, 
which further interprets the Act and Regulation Z. 
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notice shall be given, however, before the effective date of the 
change.74 
1127 
The Official Staff Commentary underscores that this is merely a 
disclosure requirement and not a substantive provision authorizing 
change-of-terms clauses. 75 The enforceability of such a clause and the 
enforceability of a change implemented pursuant to such a clause are 
governed by state law. 
The Truth in Lending Act took effect in 1969. Twenty years later 
Congress amended the Act to require additional disclosures for open-
end credit secured by the consumer's residence, so-called home 
equity loans. 76 In the course of implementing this section, Regulation 
Z departs from the implicit recognition of the enforceability of 
change-of-terms clauses. The regulation not only specifies the 
disclosures that a creditor must make, it provides that "[n ]o creditor 
may, by contract or otherwise ... [c]hange any term."77 The 
Commentary elaborates: 
A creditor may not include a general provision in its agreement 
permitting changes to any or all of the terms of the plan. For 
example, creditors may not include "boilerplate" language in the 
agreement stating that they reserve the right to change the fees 
imposed under the plan .... 78 
74. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(l) (2009). Effective February 2010, this language has been 
revised to reflect the enactment of the credit card legislation discussed below and now appears as § 
226.9(c)(2)(i). 
75. It states: 
Examples of issues not addressed by§ 226.9(c) because they are controlled by state or 
other applicable Jaw include: 
(I) The types of changes a creditor may make. 
(2) How changed terms affect existing balances, such as when a periodic rate 
is changed and the consumer does not pay off the entire existing balance 
before the new rate takes effect. 
/d. supp. I, cmt. 9(c)-2. 
76. Pub. L. No. 100-709, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 4725 (1988), adding § 127A (codified at IS U.S.C. § 
1637a (2006)). 
77. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.Sb(f)(3) (2009). Paragraph three then lists several exceptions to 
this prohibition. 
78. /d. supp. I, cmt. Sb(f)(3)(i)(2). 
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Hence, in this specific credit context, creditors are denied the power 
to impose change-of-terms clauses on consumers. The recently 
enacted Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
Act of 2009 (hereinafter Credit CARD Act), however, continues to 
recognize the creditors' use of change-of-terms clauses in other 
settings. Section 101 of the Credit CARD Act amends TILA § 127 to 
require forty-five days advance notice of certain changes in the terms 
of an open-end credit card account and gives the consumer the right 
to cancel the account and complete payment pursuant to the pre-
change terms of the account. 79 
Federal law thus tolerates change-of-terms clauses in most open-
end credit contracts. With the exception of home equity loans, it does 
not prohibit the use of those clauses. Until enactment of the Credit 
CARD Act, federal law imposed no constraints on a creditor's 
exercise of the power conferred by a change-of-terms clause. 80 
Regulation of the use of those clauses is thus a matter of state law. It 
turns out, however, state law--or at least the law of the several most 
relevant states-has been extremely supportive of a creditor's use of 
change-of-terms clauses. 
In 1978 the United States Supreme Court decided Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp}1 
holding that a bank located in Nebraska could issue a credit card to a 
consumer residing in another state and charge that consumer an 
interest rate prohibited by the consumer's state but permitted by 
Nebraska. This started a courtship by several states, seeking to attract 
credit-card issuing banks to locate their credit-card operations in 
79. Credit CARD Act of2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § IOI(a)(l), 123 Stat. 1735 (2009) (to be 
codified as Truth in Lending Act§ 127(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)); see 74 Fed. Reg. 5244, 5248 (Jan. 29, 
2009) (adding a sample form for disclosing a change of terms in an open-end credit card account). 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. app. G-20-G-23 (2009). 
80. But see Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat'! Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 390-91 (3d Cir. 2002) (power 
cannot be exercised in such a way as to make the initial disclosures inaccurate) (discussed infra text 
accompanying note 131). For the impact of the Credit CARD Act of2009, see infra text accompanying 
notes 135 and 136 (changes in certain fees must be reasonable). 
81. Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). This holding related to national 
banks. In 1980 Congress extended this rule to cover state-chartered banks. Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 50l(b), 94 Stat. 132 (1980) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(b) (2006)). 
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those states. 82 The courtship succeeded, and as a result of the 
migration, more than eighty percent of credit-card volume originates 
from issuers located in Delaware, South Dakota, Utah, Ohio, and 
Virginia. 83 The legislatures in these states either eliminated or 
drastically relaxed their usury laws and enacted other provisions that 
favor credit-card issuers. Foremost among these other provisions are 
statutes that authorize card issuers to use change-of-terms clauses. 
For example, the South Dakota law states, "[u]pon written notice, a 
credit card issuer may change the terms of any credit card agreement, 
if such right of amendment has been reserved, regardless of whether 
the card holder can use the card for new purchases. "84 Delaware goes 
further by authorizing the issuer to change the terms even if the 
contract with the consumer does not expressly so provide: "Unless 
the agreement governing a revolving credit plan otherwise provides, a 
bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agreement 
in any respect .... "85 The law in Virginia is similar, permitting the 
issuer to change terms even if the contract is silent on the matter. 86 
The law in Ohio and Utah is similar to the law in South Dakota, 
validating change-of-terms clauses. 87 All these states thus bless the 
use of change-of-terms clauses in contracts for open-end credit. 
82. See LYNN LoPuCKI, COURTING FAILURE 53-55 (2005}. 
83. These are, in alphabetical order, American Express, Bank of America, Capital One, Citibank, 
Discover, GE Money, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Target, USAA, US Bank, and Wells Fargo. Ben 
Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM, 
Jan. 15, 2010, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-industry-facts-personal-debt-
statistics-1276.php (citing NILSON REPORT (April 2009}}. The eighty percent figure is for 2008 and is 
true with respect to both number of cards issued and the dollar amount of outstanding balances. 
84. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 54-ll-10 (2008}. 
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (1999). 
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63(c) (2005} ("Any contract or plan ... may be amended in any 
respect by the bank or savings institution at any time and from time to time to modify or delete terms, or 
to add new terms . . .. "). In addition, see UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.205(1), 7 U.L.A. 88 
(1974) ("Whether or not a change is authorized by prior agreement a creditor may change the terms of 
an open-end credit account applying to any balance incurred before or after the effective date of the 
change."). 
87. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 11 09.20(d) (West 1996) ("Subject to any requirements under applicable 
federal law, a bank and a borrower may specify in their agreement any terms and conditions for 
modifying or amending the agreement."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-102(2)(a) (2006) ("[A) creditor 
may change any written term of an open-end consumer credit contract at any time while the open-end 
consumer credit contract is in effect and apply the new term to the unpaid balance in the account if ... 
the open-end consumer credit contract expressly provides that the creditor may change terms of the 
open-end consumer credit contract from time to time."}. 
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As described in the introduction to this article, however, change-
of-terms clauses are by no means confined to credit card contracts. 
Rather, they pervade all consumer contracts that contemplate an 
ongoing relationship in which a merchant provides services to a 
consumer. With respect to these other kinds of contracts, however, 
there has been no race to the bottom, and state legislation addressing 
the enforceability of change-of-terms clauses is rare. To the extent it 
exists, it is not as favorable to the dominant party as the legislation 
applicable to open-end credit contracts. We are not aware of any 
statute of general applicability that addresses change-of-terms 
clauses. But landlord-tenant legislation sometimes addresses the 
matter and does so in a manner not so favorable to the dominant 
party. Thus, a Michigan statute prohibits a landlord from including in 
a residential lease agreement a provision that permits the landlord to 
"alter a provision of the rental agreement after its commencement 
without the written consent of the tenant."88 
III. COMMON LAW LIMITS ON CHANGE-OF-TERMS CLAUSES 
Part I examined the common law doctrines and UCC rules that 
govern assent to the formation and modification of contracts. Part II 
dealt with several statutory and administrative rules that authorize or 
constrain the use of change-of-terms clauses. This part examines four 
aspects of the common law that pertain to change-of-terms 
provlSlons: interpretation, liquidated damages clauses, 
unconscionability, and good faith. 
A. Interpretation 
A contract provision that authorizes one party to change the terms 
of a contract does not necessarily enable the party to add provisions 
that deal with entirely different subject matter. A provider of cellular 
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.633(1XI) (West 2005). The paragraph goes on to provide 
exceptions for changes required by law; changes reflecting changes in taxes, insurance, or utility 
expenses; and changes in rules that are required to protect the physical health, safety, or peaceful 
enjoyment of tenants or guests. 
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phone service for example may not-under the authority of a change-
of-terms provision-amend the contract to require the subscriber, for 
an additional sum, to purchase life insurance. Several courts have 
concluded that a change-of-terms clause is properly understood to 
authorize changes in the terms that are expressly stated in the 
contract, and perhaps additional terms that are similar to those terms, 
but not additions that address extraneous matters not contemplated by 
the contract. An example of such extraneous matter is dispute 
resolution. 89 The scope of a change-of-terms clause is not unlimited. 
An attempted addition of a term beyond the scope of the clause will 
not be effective. 90 
B. Liquidated Damages 
A second limitation on the enforceability of certain changed terms 
is the law governing penalty clauses. Under traditional contract 
doctrine, parties to a contract may stipulate in advance what the 
remedies will be in the event of a breach. But the stipulation must 
have as its objective the specification of damages in circumstances in 
which the loss is difficult to ascertain.91 If the objective is punishment 
89. Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce a 
provision that would have required disputes to be resolved only by arbitration); Kortum-Managhan v. 
Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693 (Mont. 2009) (same); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (same); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(same). 
90. In response to this restrictive interpretation of the power granted by a change-of-terms provision, 
the Utah legislature amended its statute by adding: "For purposes of this section, 'change' includes to 
add, delete, or otherwise change a term of an open-end consumer credit contract." 1999 Utah Laws 180, 
§ 2 (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-102 (2001)). 
Delaware went even further, demonstrating the extent of its capture by the credit-card industry, 
when it amended DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2001) to read: 
[a] bank may at any time and from time to time amend such agreement in any respect, 
whether or not the amendment or the subject of the amendment was originally 
contemplated or addressed by the parties or was integral to the relationship between the 
parties. Without limiting the foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the 
addition of new terms or by the deletion or modification of existing terms, whether 
relating to [enumerating more than a dozen features of open-end credit] or other matters 
of any kind whatsoever. 
72 Del. Laws 15, § 12 (1999). 
Presumably, even the Delaware statute has some limit (e.g., the insurance example in the text). 
And, of course, these statutes apply only to open-end credit contracts, so restrictive interpretations 
remain applicable to other kinds of contracts (e.g., telephone, television, and banking services). 
91. REsTATEMENT(FlRST)OFCONTRACTS § 339(1)(1932): 
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of behavior that amounts to breach of the contract, the stipulation is 
not enforceable.92 Drawing heavily on Article 2 of the UCC, the 
Restatement (Second) provides: 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of 
the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the 
difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy 
as a penalty.93 
Properly viewed, consumer contracts call for the consumer to 
perform as agreed, including making payments in a timely fashion 
and observing other terms of the agreement, such as not exceeding a 
credit limit. When the contract stipulates amounts that consumers 
must pay when they breach these parts of the agreement, those 
amounts must be justified as sound estimates of loss to the other party 
under circumstances in which it is not feasible for that party to 
establish the amount of damages caused by the breach. Often this is 
not the case. Instead, the amounts seem intended to deter or punish 
the specified behavior (or simply generate revenue). Examples 
include such things as fees for exceeding a credit limit, failing to 
make a payment by its due date, and writing a check on an account 
An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable 
as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is 
caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation. 
92. Jd. cmt. a: 
Punishment of a promisor for breach, without regard to the extent of the harm that he has 
caused, is an unjust and unnecessary remedy. Therefore, the power of parties to make an 
enforceable contract for the determination of damages in advance is limited as stated in 
this Section. 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 356(1) (1981); cf U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2002): 
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an 
amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the 
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of 
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated 
damages is void as a penalty. 
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that has insufficient funds. In the context of setting a fee, a 
merchant's exercise of the power granted by a change-of-terms 
clause is limited by the doctrine of liquidated damages. 
C. Unconscionability 
Another constraint on the enforceability of such clauses is the 
doctrine of unconscionability. Prodded by the enactment of the UCC, 
courts have embraced this historic doctrine and extended its 
application to contracts outside the scope of the UCC.94 According to 
the landmark case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,95 
unconscionability consists of the "absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party."96 This has evolved into 
the idea that there are procedural and substantive elements to 
unconscionability.97 Courts have stated variously that both elements 
must be present;98 that they comprise a sliding scale, so that the more 
pronounced one element is, the less necessary is the other; 99 and that 
94. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002) (applicable to ''transactions in goods"). The Restatement (Second), 
applicable to all contracts, states: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without 
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 
RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 {1981); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) 
(adopting the language ofU.C.C. § 2-302 but making it generally applicable to all contracts). For use of 
the doctrine outside the scope ofU.C.C. Article 2, see, for example, Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 
570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (cell phone service); Best v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 
1987) (checking account). 
95. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (decided after the 
enactment but before the effective date of the UCC). 
96. Another landmark case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A2d 69 (N.J. 1960), spoke 
in terms of public policy, never using the term unconscionability. But its articulation of reasons why an 
automobile manufacturer's exclusion of liability for personal injuries caused by a defective product 
emphasized the buyer's lack of choice concerning the contract term, coupled with the unreasonableness 
of foreclosing compensation for personal injuries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, 
cmt. a ( 1981) ("(Unconscionability] overlaps with rules which render particular bargains or terms 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy."). 
97. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor 's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. 
REv. 485,487 (1967). 
98. E.g., Garrett v. Janiewski, 480 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
99. E.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). 
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in a contract of adhesion the adhesive nature of the contract per se 
satisfies the procedural element ofunconscionability. 100 
It is often assumed that unconscionability is to be determined as of 
the inception of the contract. The articulation of UCC § 2-302 
supports this belief: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract 
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made .... " 101 Other authority, however, supports the view that 
unconscionability may be determined as of a later point in the 
contractual relationship. In the context of the sale of goods, UCC § 2-
719 permits the seller to displace the remedies ordinarily available 
under the UCC by limiting the buyer to repair or replacement of 
goods that do not conform to the contract. 102 It also provides, 
however, that "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as 
provided in this Act."103 This provision requires an examination of 
the situation as_ of the time of breach, not the inception of the 
contract. So does the next subsection of § 2-719: 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless 
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of 
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of 
damages where the loss is commercial is not. 104 
The unconscionability of an exclusion of consequential damages 
depends on the situation at the time of the injury. The circumstances 
surrounding the breach are relevant to determining whether an 
exclusion of consequential damages is unconscionable. For example, 
if there is a defect in the electrical system of a car and the car is out 
100. E.g., Flores v. Trans-America HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cat. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 
cf Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (either procedural or substantive 
unconscionability may suffice). 
101. To same effect is REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 208 (1981)("1f a contract or term 
thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made . . . . "). 
I 02. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
103. u.c.c. § 2-719(2) (2002). 
104. !d. § 2-719(3). 
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of service for a week for repairs, it may not be unconscionable to 
exclude recovery of damages for the diminished value of the car and 
for the cost of a rental during that week. But if the defect in the 
electrical system causes a fire that destroys the car, it may indeed be 
unconscionable to foreclose the recovery of the consequential 
damages for destruction of the car and the cost of a rental during the 
period it reasonably takes the buyer to purchase a replacement. 105 The 
point is that the unconscionability of the exclusion of consequential 
damages cannot be determined until those damages are known. 
In the context of a change-of-terms clause, one could examine 
whether the clause is unconscionable because it confers the power on 
the dominant party, leaving the other party at the mercy of the 
dominant one. On its face, this seems to be the view of the Principles 
of the Law of Software Contracts, recently adopted by the American 
Law Institute. Section 1.11 tracks UCC § 2-302, referring to 
unconscionability at the inception of the contract, and Illustration 4 
states that "[a] court should hold [a change-of-terms provision] 
unconscionable because it attempts to bind the transferee to terms of 
which it is not and cannot be aware at the time of contracting." 106 
The broad sweep of this assertion, if applied to a contract for the sale 
of goods, would mean that the parties could not agree that the seller 
would, post-formation, determine the price of the goods. And yet, as 
we have seen, the UCC specifically permits an open-price contract. 107 
Given the constraints of good faith established by statute and the 
common law, 108 this assertion in the Software Principles is untenable 
as a matter of general applicability. 109 
One could (as in the goods case) say that the unconscionability of 
the clause must be determined at the outset and that the clause is 
105. See Roy Ryden Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure of Purpose: A 
Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759, 775-76 (1977); Jonathan A. 
Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C. C. Section 2-719(2), 
65 CAL. L. REv. 28, 29 (1977). 
I 06. PRINCIPLES OF rnE LAW OF SOITW ARE CONTRACTS § 1.11, illus. 4 (2009). 
I 07. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
108. See infra Part J.D. 
109. Of coum:, the Principles do not assert it as a matter of general applicability. In the context of 
software contracts, it may be a perfectly sound proposition. That is a matter beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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unconscionable at the outset to the extent that the merchant later 
exercises it in a particular way. But this seems to mask that the 
inquiry is made as of the time the merchant attempts to exercise the 
power given by the clause. And the review concerns whether that 
exercise surpasses the appropriate bounds of the authorization to 
make changes unilaterally. 110 Several courts agree. 
Courts have invoked unconscionability as a limit on the 
enforceability of change-of-terms clauses. An example is Powertel, 
Inc. v. Bexley, 111 in which a cellular phone service provider added a 
forced-arbitration clause to its existing contracts, by means of a 
revised agreement included in an envelope containing a monthly bill. 
Plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of consumers who had allegedly 
been improperly charged for long-distance calls. 112 Defendant 
attempted to shunt the proceedings into arbitration, but the court held 
that the arbitration clause-added by means of a change-of-terms 
clause-was unconscionable. 113 It rejected defendant's argument that 
plaintiffs could have avoided the clause by terminating their contracts 
and finding another telephone service. Doing so would have entailed 
inconvenience and expense, so plaintiffs did not have a meaningful 
choice about the matter. 114 Further, the bill stuffer did not call 
plaintiffs' attention to the fact or substance of the changed 
agreement. 115 As another court recently put it, "Without notice [of the 
110. Cf KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362 (1960), speaking of standard-form 
contracts: 
It would be a heart-warming scene, a triumph of private attention to what is essentially 
private self-government in the lesser transactions of life . .. if only all business men and 
all their lawyers would be reasonable. 
But power, like greed, if it does not always corrupt, goes easily to the head. So that the 
form agreements tend either at once or over the years, and often by whole lines of trade, 
into a massive and almost terrifYing jug-handled character; the one party lays his head 
into the mouth of a lion-either, and mostly-without reading the fine print, or 
occasionally in hope and expectation (not infrequently solid) that it will be a sweet and 
gentle lion. 
Ill. Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
112. /d. 
113. /d. at 574. 
114. Plaintiffs would have had to purchase new telephones and, at a time before the portability of 
phone numbers, obtain new numbers. In some contexts, though evidently not in Powertel, the consumer 
may be subject to an early termination charge. 
115. Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 574. 
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changed term], an examination would be fairly cumbersome, as [the 
consumer] would have had to compare every word of the ... contract 
with his existing contract in order to detect whether it had 
changed."116 Having concluded that the modification was 
procedurally unconscionable, the court then concluded that it was 
substantively unconscionable as well. 117 
Given the prevalence of change-of-terms clauses, a consumer 
cannot reasonably avoid them. In that sense then, there is an absence 
of meaningful choice. But the real focus must be on the dominant 
party's exercise of the power granted by a change-of-terms provision. 
Here, too, there often is an absence of meaningful choice: the 
consumer may reasonably avoid a particular exercise of the power 
given by a change-of-terms clause only by ending the relationship 
with the other party. Whether this is sufficient to supply a meaningful 
choice depends at best on the expense and inconvenience in ending 
the relationship. If termination entails substantial expense or 
inconvenience, there is no meaningful choice. Even if there is no 
expense and little inconvenience, if all (or substantially all) of the 
other party's competitors have adopted the new term, there is no 
meaningful choice. 118 The enforceability of the change then will turn 
on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the changed term, i.e. 
whether the term unreasonably favors the merchant. 
The consequences of a conclusion of unconscionability bear 
noting. Under the Restatement formulation, if a court holds a change-
of-terms provision, or the party's exercise of it, to be unconscionable, 
the court may limit or refuse enforcement. But a consumer protection 
statute may provide for additional remedies. Known variously as 
116. Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 F.3d 1062, 1066 n.l (9th Cir. 2007). 
Compare the agreements cited in notes 13-15 supra, purporting to make changes in their terms effective 
merely by posting the change on the dominant party's web site. This presumably requires the adhering 
party to visit the site periodically (daily?) to read the entire agreement to see if any of the terms has 
changed. 
117. Powerte/, 743 So. 2d at 576--77 (reaching that conclusion because the arbitration clause cut off 
the consumer's right to common law and statutory remedies and foreclosed the possibility of proceeding 
by class action even though the damages suffered by any one consumer were too small to warrant 
assertion of rights in either litigation or arbitration). 
118. In jurisdictions that treat adhesion contracts as per se procedurally unconscionable, supra note 
I 00, it would not matter that the consumer could find a contract elsewhere on other terms. 
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UDAPs (for Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Acts), consumer 
fraud acts, deceptive trade practices acts, or little-FTC acts, these 
statutes often prohibit unconscionable acts or practices. 119 One who 
violates the prohibition may be liable not only for actual damages, 
but also minimum damages, 120 multiple damages, 121 and in the event 
of successful proceedings to establish the violation, costs and 
attorney's fees. 122 
D. Good Faith 
This brings us to the final constraint on the exercise of the power 
granted by change-of-terms clauses: the obligation of good faith. 
Drawing again on the UCC, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
states, "[ e ]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."123 Per the 
vee, "good faith" means "honesty in fact and the observance of 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."124 Citing this 
definition, the Restatement concurs, stating: 
The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its 
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith 
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
119. See CAROLYN CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 
4.4.1 n.711 (7th ed. 2008) (in 17 states, the consumer protection act proscribes unconscionability). 
120. E.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act§ 14(a), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-636(a) (2005) (allowing 
up to $10,000 for each violation). 
121. E.g., New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-19 (West 2001) (requiring courts 
to award treble damages). 
122. E.g., Michigan Consumer Protection Act§ ll(b)(2), MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 445.9ll(b)(2) (2002). 
For a compilation of the remedies available under UDAPs, see CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 119, 
app.A. 
123. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). Section 1-304 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides, "[ e]very contract or duty within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-304 (2003). Revised Article I 
has been enacted in more than 30 states. In the rest, a substantively identical provision appears in § 1-
203. 
124. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2003). Most of the states that have enacted revised Article I have enacted 
this definition, though a minority have enacted the prior version, which appears in (former)§ 1-201(19) 
("honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"). U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1999) Even in those 
states, for transactions within the scope of Article 2 (sales of goods), the objective definition applies. 
U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (2002) (for panies who are merchants). 
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faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety 
of types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" 
because they violate community standards of decency, fairness 
or reasonableness. 125 
[B]ad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair 
dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of 
types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are 
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: 
b f 'fy 126 ... a use o a power to spect terms .... 
1139 
A change-of-terms provision empowers the merchant to fix or 
change a term of the contract. In exercising this power, however, the 
merchant must act in good faith, which the foregoing authorities posit 
includes the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing and consistency with the reasonable expectations of the 
consumer. More than twenty years ago the Supreme Court of Oregon 
properly applied the obligation of good faith to police a merchant's 
exercise of the power to change terms of a consumer contract. In Best 
v. United States National Bank, 127 defendant bank imposed a fee on 
depositors who wrote checks on accounts that had insufficient funds 
for the checks to clear (NSF fees). The depositors brought a class 
action alleging, inter alia, that the bank breached its obligation to set 
the fee in good faith. 128 The trial court granted the bank's motion for 
125. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 crnt. a ( 1979). 
126. /d. crnt. d. See generally Steven Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REv. I (1981) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith]; Steven 
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith, 94 HAR.v. L. REV. 
369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; Clayton Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of 
Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 619; Robert Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition 
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810 (1982). For a recent survey of cases discussing the 
obligation of good faith, see Edward J. Irnwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract 
Law: Is It Time to Write Its Obituary? 42 TEx. TECH L. REv. I (2009). 
127. Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987). 
128. /d. at 555. 
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summary judgment, but the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed, 
stating: 
When one party to a contract is given discretion in the 
performance of some aspect of the contract, the parties ordinarily 
contemplate that that discretion will be exercised for particular 
purposes. If the discretion is exercised for purposes not 
contemplated by the parties, the party exercising discretion has 
performed in bad faith. 
In this case the Bank had the contractual discretion to set its NSF 
fees .... [T]hat discretion had to be exercised within the confines 
of the reasonable expectations of the depositors .... 129 
According to the court, those reasonable expectations were that 
charges for ancillary "services" would be set on the same basis as the 
charges for maintaining a checking account, viz., in an amount 
sufficient to cover the bank's cost of providing the services plus its 
ordinary profit on those costs. When the bank's internal 
communications revealed that the fees were far in excess of those 
costs (and profit), a fact finder could conclude that the fees were set 
to "reap the large profits to be made from the apparently inelastic 
'demand' for the processing of NSF checks and in order to 
discourage its depositors from carelessly writing NSF checks."130 
A few years later the Oregon court had occasion to apply this 
limitation again. In Tolbert v. First National Bank of Oregon, 131 a 
class of consumers again challenged a bank's exercise of the power 
to change terms when it increased its NSF fees. The facts differed 
from those in Best, however, because the consumers in Tolbert were 
informed of the amount of the NSF fee when they opened their 
129. /d. at 558. 
130. Id at 559. 
131. Tolbert v. First Nat' I Bank of Or., 823 P.2d 965 (Or. 1991). 
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checking accounts, and they were informed of subsequent changes in 
the fee. 132 The consumers in Best were not informed of either. 133 To 
the Oregon Supreme Court, these differences were critical. Since 
there was no evidence that the consumers in Tolbert were aware of 
the pricing mechanism for the bank's services, they had no 
reasonable expectation of the pricing mechanism for resetting the 
NSF fee. 134 The consumers were aware of the initial NSF fee, the 
contract empowered the bank to change the fee, the bank notified 
them before the changes became effective, and the consumers 
continued to maintain their accounts. The court held that summary 
judgment for the bank was appropriate. 135 
This reasoning severely limits, perhaps even abrogates, the 
obligation to perform in good faith. It permits the party with the 
power to set the terms to set them in any way it wishes. Under this 
reasoning, the bank could set its NSF fee at, say, $1 ,000 per check, so 
long as it gave notice of the change, even if the change is not 
commercially reasonable and not consistent with the consumer's 
reasonable expectations. But this is not the law. The obligation to 
perform in good faith constitutes a substantive limit on the terms the 
dominant party may adopt under the authority of a change-of terms 
prOVISIOn. 
The reasonable expectations of a consumer include the expectation 
that the other party's specification of a term will not upset the 
allocation of risk fixed by the contract and will not subject the 
consumer to punitive sanctions for minor breaches of the contract. 136 
To put the extreme case, retroactive changes are beyond reasonable 
expectations: the purchaser of a computer pursuant to an installment 
sales contract with a change-of-terms clause does not reasonably 
expect that the seller may increase the price after the computer has 
132. Jd. at 966. 
133. /d. at 967. 
134. Jd. at 970. 
135. See Grasso v. First USA Bank, 713 A.2d 304, 311 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding there can be 
no breach of good faith when the contract expressly pennits modification of the interest rate). 
136. See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 126, at 372-73. See generally Robert Dugan, 
Standardized Forms: Unconscionability and Good Faith, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 711 (1979); Summers, 
supra note 126. 
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been delivered and put into use. Such an exercise of the power to 
change terms would not be in good faith, and would be 
unenforceable. Similarly, a change-of-terms clause in a contract for 
an automobile and an extended warranty cannot properly empower 
the seller to increase the price of the warranty if the car requires more 
than a specified number of repairs. These risks are allocated to the 
seller, and any change in the price reallocates the risk in an 
unexpected way. 
The same, we would say, is true of increasing the interest rate on a 
fixed-rate credit card. If a creditor issues a consumer a fixed-rate 
card, any change in the rate pursuant to a change-of-terms provision 
should be effective only as to charges incurred after the change. The 
change should not be effective as to existing balances. 137 As to 
existing balances, the card issuer assumes the credit risk and should 
no more be able to change the interest rate than a creditor can hike 
the interest in a fixed-rate, closed-end auto loan or home mortgage 
loan. Absent a failure to pay, deterioration in the consumer's credit 
rating should not enable the creditor to increase the interest rate. 
Application of the changed rate to existing balances is an attempt to 
retake an opportunity that the card issuer gave up under the original 
contract. This is a prime example of the lack of good faith. 138 
Good faith also serves as a limit on the creditor's ability to make 
prospective changes in the interest rate. In terms of the amount of the 
increase, the sky is not the limit. And in terms of the timing of the 
change, the creditor must act reasonably. To illustrate, in Rossman v. 
Fleet Bank (Rl) National Association, 139 the bank issued a no-annual-
fee card that included a change-of-terms provision empowering it to 
change the features of the account at any time. 140 Approximately six 
months later the bank attempted to institute an annual fee. 141 The 
court held, however, that if the change-of-terms provision permitted 
137. But see Barrer v. Chase Bank, 566 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) ("We agree with Chase that it 
must be able to adjust the price of credit according to how risky it is to lend to a given cardholder."); 
Grasso, 713 A.2d 304. 
138. E.g., Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 126, at 372. 
139. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (RI) Nat'! Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002). 
140. /d. at 388. 
141. /d. 
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the bank to change the no-annual-fee feature whenever it wanted, the 
card was not properly described as "no-annual fee." 142 The court 
decided the case under the Truth in Lending Act, 143 but the decision 
could just have easily been grounded on the bank's obligation to 
perform in good faith. 144 The Credit CARD Act confirms that there is 
a substantive limitation on the timing of the bank's power under the 
change-of-terms clause in Rossman: the Act amends the Truth-in-
Lending Act by adding a prohibition against increasing the interest 
rate during the first year of an account. Notably, it does not 
characterize the increase as a violation of a disclosure provision of 
the statute. 145 Instead, the prohibition represents Congress's judgment 
that it is not appropriate for a card issuer to use its authority under a 
change-of-terms clause to increase the interest on a fixed-rate card 
shortly after issuing the card. 
Other provisions in the Credit CARD Act confirm this view that 
there are substantive limits on the power conferred by a change-of-
terms provision. The Act requires that late fees, over-the-limit fees, 
and other fees be reasonable in amount. 146 It prohibits retroactive 
142. /d. at 395. 
143. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) (2009) ("Disclosures shall reflect the tenns of the legal 
obligation between the parties."); see Official Staff Commentary, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 
I, cmt. 5( c)( I) (2009) ('The disclosures should reflect the credit terms to which the parties are legally 
bound at the time of giving the disclosures."). 
144. Indeed, the complaint in Rossman also alleged breach of contract, but that allegation was not 
before the court. 
145. Credit CARD Act of2009 § IOI(d), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1737 (2009) (to be codified as 
Truth in Lending Act§ 172(a), 15 U.S.C. § J666k(a)). 
146. Credit CARD Act of2009 § 102(b), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1740 (2009)(to be codified as 
Truth in Lending Act§ 149, 15 U.S.C. § 1665d): 
(a) In General-The amount of any penalty fee or charge that a card issuer may impose 
with respect to a credit card account under an open end consumer credit plan in 
connection with any omission with respect to, or violation of, the cardholder agreement, 
including any late payment fee, over-the-limit fee, or any other penaltY fee or charge, 
shall be reasonable and proportional to such omission or violation. 
Unfortunately, the legislation refers to "penalty" fees and charges. Although it subjects them to the 
requirement of reasonableness, it would be better to characterize them simply as "other" fees and not 
support the notion that (reasonable) penalties are enforceable. Note, however, that it requires the penalty 
fee to be "reasonable and proportional to such omission or violation," a standard that may be similar to 
the common-law standards for liquidated damages. The next subsection of§ 149 directs the Federal 
Reserve Board to promulgate a rule establishing "standards for assessing whether the amount of any 
penalty fee or charge described under subsection (a) is reasonable and proportional to the omission or 
violation to which the charge relates." In developing the rule, the Board is to consider the conduct of the 
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changes in the annual percentage rate, though it gives the creditor 
limited permission to increase the rate applicable to existing balances 
if the consumer defaults to the extent of being at least sixty days late 
in paying. 147 These provisions recognize the proposition that a change 
in the terms of an existing consumer contract must be reasonable. 
Although the Credit CARD Act applies only to open-end credit 
contracts, the proposition that good faith (and reasonableness) serve 
as limits on the exercise of authority granted by a change-of-terms 
clause applies to all consumer contracts. Given the expansive view of 
assent embodied by the objective theory of the mutual assent 
necessary for formation of contract, a substantive limitation on the 
power conferred by that assent is especially appropriate when it is 
given in the context of a contract of adhesion that is not read, not 
expected to be read, and not desired to be read. 
Support for this view that there are limits on the power conferred 
by a change-of-terms provision may be found in the law governing 
other transactions. One example is the sale of goods, governed by the 
provisions of Article 2 of the UCC and discussed in Part I of this 
article. Another is rental of residential real estate. The Uniform 
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act permits a landlord to adopt 
regulations during the term of a lease, even in the absence of 
cardholder; the cost of that conduct to the creditor; the deterrence of that conduct; and any other factors 
that the Board deems appropriate. /d. 
147. Credit CARD Act of2009 § IOI(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1735 (2009) (adding new 
Truth in Lending Act §§ 17l(a}, 171(b)(4), to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666j). Although the Act 
permits retroactive adjustment to this limited extent, it requires the card issuer to roll the rate back to its 
prior level if the consumer makes the minimum required payments for the six months following the 
effective date of the increase: 
(a) IN GENERAL-In the case of any credit card account under an open end consumer 
credit plan, no creditor may increase any annual percentage rate, fee, or finance charge 
applicable to any outstanding balance, except as permitted under subsection (b). 
(b) EXCEPTIONs-The prohibitions under subsection (a) shall not apply to-
(4) an increase due solely to the fact that a minimum payment by the obligor has not 
been received by the creditor within 60 days after the due date for such payment, 
provided that the creditor shall-
(B) terminate such increase not later than 6 months after the date on which it is 
imposed, if the creditor receives the required minimum payments on time during that 
period. 
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authorization in the lease. 148 But any such regulation is enforceable 
only if it is not for the purpose of evading the landlord's obligations, 
does not make a substantial modification of the bargain, and is 
reasonably related to the purpose for which it is adopted. 149 
CONCLUSION 
Contracts of adhesion abound. In the context of consumer 
transactions, especially, they are nearly universal. The drafting party 
does not want the consumer to read the contract document, and it is 
not rational for a consumer to read the document, except perhaps for 
the few dickered terms. The other terms are not subject to negotiation 
and are likely to be difficult to understand and unlikely ever to be 
invoked. Use of contract provisions that authorize the dominant party 
to change the terms of the contract at will are omnipresent in a wide 
range of contracts for credit and services. Taken literally, these 
provisions authorize the dominant party to make any change it 
desires, adding whatever term it desires. In this article we have 
shown that there is ample authority for imposing limits on the 
exercise of this power. This authority originates in federal and state 
legislation and administrative regulation, the UCC, and the common 
law. We call on the dominant party in consumer transactions to 
exercise its power with restraint, in a manner consistent with the 
adhering party's reasonable expectations, and we call on the courts to 
draw on their legal authority, especially the obligation of good faith, 
to rein in a party that would use its power under a change-of-terms 
provision in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations 
of the consumer. 
148. UNIF. REsiDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT Acr § 3.102(a) (1972). 
149. /d. § 3.102(a)-{b). For several interpretive challenges under the language of this section, see 
Horwitz, supra note 23, at 96. 
